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While gaining popularity in mainstream media, the $1 CEO salary is a trend 
whose motives and impact remain largely misunderstood. This paper examines a dataset 
of 155 companies that have implemented the $1 salary. Statistical testing is used to 
analyze the relationship of $1 salaries to several variables including company financial 
measures and descriptive CEO attributes. The trends in research and development 
spending, capital expenditures, and stock price that result before and during the $1 
salary period are also examined. The goal of this research is to understand the 
relationship between $1 CEO salaries and long-term spending in the form of research 
and development and capital expenditures. The secondary goal is to understand how the 
$1 salary acts as a form of extreme incentive compensation and investor signaling by 
using long-term spending as a proxy for managerial belief in future firm performance. 
The findings in this thesis suggest that $1 CEOs have strong beliefs in their firms as 
demonstrated by the $1 salary and increases to long-term spending. However, investors 
do not appear to share this same belief in the firm which suggests the $1 salary may be 
an ineffective attempt at signaling.   
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Introduction 
Notable figures such as Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg have made news in 
recent years joining a small, but growing group of $1 salaried chief executive officers 
(CEOs). A $1 salary is a stark contrast to the millions of dollars many CEOs receive 
annually. Many companies are under scrutiny for the increasing pay disparity between 
wage workers and executives where CEOs’ salaries are in the millions while their 
lowest paid workers struggle to meet ends. Liz Shuler, Secretary-Treasurer of the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, commented on 
the issue saying, “Too many working people are struggling to get by, to afford the 
basics… while CEOs are paying themselves more and more” (Kimes, 2011). In 2017, a 
typical CEO at an S&P 500 Index firm made an average of 361 times the salary of their 
average worker (Hembree, 2018). Some companies like Google and Oracle have taken 
an opposite approach to executive compensation. These companies have decreased 
CEO salaries to $1 or less. Often to replace this salary, the CEO’s compensation will 
come in other forms such as stock options and performance-based bonuses. 
This $1 CEO salary trend has evolved over time from a cost-cutting sacrificial 
act in its infancy to a statement made by successful, high-profile companies in more 
recent years. As the trend has evolved, so too has the motivations behind it and the 
executive actions taken because of it. This thesis examines this $1 CEO salary trend and 
its relationship to long-term spending in the form of research and development and 
capital expenditures. Additionally, the $1 salary is examined as a form of extreme 
incentive compensation and a form of signaling to investors with long-term spending 
used as a proxy for management’s belief in future firm performance.  
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Historical Context 
The first instance of something resembling the $1 CEO salary occurred in the 
early twentieth century during World War One. During the war, there were a group of 
nearly 1,000 wealthy American businessmen who wanted to help the government and 
serve in the military. Most of these men were independently wealthy and had income 
over $6,000 ($87,000 adjusted for inflation). Because they were well-off financially, 
they did not want to take the government’s money to serve their country. However, the 
US military could not have unpaid volunteers, and as a result, the men were 
compensated with a $1 annual salary. These men were known as Dollar a Year Men 
(Sacramento Union, 1919). 
Chrysler took this dollar a year concept and applied it to CEO compensation in 
1978. Lee Iacocca became the CEO of Chrysler with a $1 salary. Chrysler was on the 
brink of bankruptcy, and Iacocca was tasked with turning the failure around and 
reviving the company. Iacocca went to the US Congress to make a case for federal loan 
guarantees for Chrysler. He was successful in his pleas and by 1983, Chrysler paid back 
the government loans early and was able to turn a profit. While Iacocca started with a 
$1 salary, by 1980 he made the list for Forbes’ Best Paid CEOs with a salary of 
$868,000 (Weinberg, 2002). In the case of Chrysler, with a $1 salary, Iacocca 
transformed Chrysler’s strategy and returned it to profitability.  
The $1 salary initially was a sacrificial act to help struggling companies cut 
costs and recover financially. CEOs of other large companies followed Iacocca’s 
example and continued this trend. In the past decade, executives from high-profile, 
successful companies have taken $1 salaries and brought renewed attention to this 
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trend. In 2004, Google co-founders and current CEO and president, Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin took a $1 salary. Other notable figures include John Mackey, CEO of 
Whole Foods, Jeremy Stoppleman, CEO of Yelp, and Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of 
Facebook. Unlike Chrysler, in many of these recent examples, these companies are not 
facing financial struggles. This suggests that the meaning behind the $1 salary has 
shifted. Current motivations could be to signify that the CEO has a large stake in their 
company and that the compensation they receive is coming only from their stock in the 
company. John Mackey’s comments on his own compensation reveal another possible 
motivation, altruism. “I have enough money, and the deeper motivations for me are to 
do service and try to do good in the world,” Mackey remarked (Kowitt, 2015). 
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Background and Existing Literature 
Executive Compensation 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of large, publicly traded companies bring 
home up to millions of dollars in total compensation. CEOs are the highest ranking and 
usually highest paid individuals within a company. The CEO is the top manager 
responsible for both major strategic decisions as well as approving aspects of day-to-
day operations. The CEO is exposed to some amount of risk as they are responsible for 
failures of the company at the end of the day. As a result, CEOs are paid well to 
compensate for the risk they assume and the decisions they must make. In large 
companies, CEO compensation is often determined by a board of directors. The board 
of directors is created to represent shareholder interest. Shareholders are those who own 
shares or stock in a company. Because the number of shareholders can be so massive, 
public corporations have a board of directors to make sure that the company is acting in 
line with what is best for shareholders and stakeholders. In some cases, the CEO may be 
on the board of directors and/or hold considerable influence over their decisions.  
Executive compensation includes a base salary that can be millions of dollars 
depending on the size of the company. The compensation may also include bonuses that 
are dependent on firm performance as measured by profit, growth, or other financial 
metrics. Stock options give executives the right to buy or sell stock for a certain price 
within a time period. Common stock may also be included in the compensation 
package. This stock allows CEOs to own shares and become a shareholder themselves. 
Common stock may include dividends, money that is paid out to shareholders on a 
periodic basis from the company’s profit. CEOs may also receive ancillary 
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compensation in the form of security or private jets. Because CEOs are often considered 
the face of the company, a company may give the CEO certain luxuries to portray an 
image of wealth or success. All these different elements can make up the CEO’s 
compensation package.  
Incentive Compensation 
To incentivize managers to make decisions that will be beneficial for the 
company, compensation can be tied to the firm’s overall performance. The goal of 
incentive compensation is to align manager and firm interests. When certain 
performance targets are met, the manager receives compensation in the form of bonuses 
or stock options. These performance indicators may be based on financial metrics such 
as stock price, net income, and revenue growth or non-financial metrics such as 
customer relation scores, quality of products, or firm reputation. Often, the performance 
targets will be set in the beginning of the year or quarter, so the manager will be aware 
of them. During the year or quarter end review, these targets will be assessed. 
Depending on how well they are met, the manager may receive none, a fraction, or the 
total amount of the incentive compensation.  
Incentive compensation varies greatly from salary compensation. Often an 
employee will have both types of compensation. Salaried employees are paid a fixed 
amount for the total year, divided evenly throughout the company’s pay periods. A 
salary may increase on a year to year basis with improvement in performance through 
pay raises. However, because of its fixed nature, it does not necessarily motivate CEOs 
to improve performance. This compensation is guaranteed even if the firm experiences 
poor performance or the CEO makes decisions that negatively impact the firm. A 
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CEO’s total compensation package usually includes both salary and incentive 
compensation.  
Signaling 
In relation to finance and economics, signaling means that one party is 
conveying information about itself to another party through their actions. In the 
corporate world of publicly traded companies, investor opinions are important as they 
reflect to the market how successful the company is expected to be. When companies 
take actions that suggest they will be profitable in the future, there is often a resulting 
increase in their stock prices. Investors tend to buy more shares of companies that are 
projected to be successful and have higher returns in the future. This drives up the 
prices of these stocks and increases the company’s market value. While companies 
rarely outright say how successful they anticipate they will be in the future, their actions 
often reflect their predictions of future firm performance. In signaling, the investors 
notice these actions and use them to make valuation decisions regarding the company. If 
a company lays off hundreds of employees or an executive makes a sudden exit, the 
investors may be more inclined to sell the company’s stock, decreasing its value. 
Signaling is often a deliberate action by the company in which they are aware of 
how investors will perceive their actions. As Spence (1973) concluded in his research, 
signaling relates to observable characteristics about a party that are within the control of 
that party. Companies know what actions investors will notice and can make changes in 
these areas to gain attention. Publicly traded companies have regular correspondence 
with investors through quarterly earnings calls. However, if the company wants to 
reveal something about themselves in a less obvious manner, they may turn to 
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signaling. This signaling may take the form of adjusting executive leadership or 
drastically changing executive compensation. If the company wants their stock price to 
rise, they may take actions that the market will interpret as beneficial for future success 
and then in turn increase the valuation of the company and its stock. 
Long-Term Spending 
Two major ways that a company can invest in long-term projects is through 
research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures (CapEx). R&D is the area of 
the company dedicated to improving and inventing products and processes. Innovative 
companies such as Amazon and Google spend billions of dollars on R&D annually, and 
the average amount of spending varies by industry. R&D spending relates to the long-
term future of a company as many of the products it develops will take years before 
they hit the market and influence a company’s financial performance. Not all R&D 
projects will be profitable, and some may never leave the R&D labs. The return on 
R&D investments can be difficult to accurately guarantee which causes R&D spending 
to have an uncertain nature. Because of its uncertain nature and relation to long-term 
profitability, R&D spending may be a signal of a manager’s belief about future firm 
performance. If a CEO believes their company will be profitable in the future, they may 
encourage R&D spending as this will help the company remain profitable in the coming 
years. Alternatively, if the company is struggling, the CEO may decrease R&D 
spending as its returns may not be realized until much later.  
The nature of capital expenditures makes them less risky investments than R&D. 
Capital expenditures are costs incurred when buying or improving property, plant, and 
equipment of a company. Spending on capital expenditures indicates that long-term 
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assets have been acquired or maintained. Often, these assets are necessary for a 
company’s normal operations and may include the offices where employees work, 
storefronts that sell products to consumers, and machines that produce goods. The 
return on these investments is more certain than the unpredictable returns of R&D 
spending. 
Existing Literature 
In addition to being a matter of public scrutiny, executive compensation is an 
area that has been extensively studied in academic accounting research. Studies 
conducted by Abernathy (2015) suggest that powerful CEOs hold strong influence over 
their firm’s compensation systems in the face of regulatory and public pressure. CEOs 
often have a large amount of power over their compensation. Byun (2016) researched 
pay dispersion and earnings management. He concluded that executives who believe 
that their relative level of compensation is unfair are more likely to engage in earnings 
management. This study provides evidence that CEOs have significant control over 
their compensation.  
Research has also been conducted on the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm characteristics. Zajac (1990) concluded that several CEO issues 
could predict variation in firm performance. Included in these issues was the importance 
of CEO’s perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth. If 
this link is perceived to be strong, the predicted firm performance should be higher. 
Additionally, Gaver (1993) highlights the difference between growth and nongrowth 
firms in executive compensation matters. Growth firms are more likely to pay higher 
levels of cash compensation and offer more stock option plans than their nongrowth 
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counterparts. This research has not been applied to $1 salaries, but the type of firm may 
play a role into whether the $1 salary exists. 
CEO compensation can also be linked to public perception of the company. 
Maug (2012) examined the connection between CEO compensation and prestige. If the 
firm is included in Fortune’s ranking of most admired companies, CEO pay is generally 
lower. This is hypothesized to be caused by the non-monetary benefits CEOs receive 
from working for a prestigious firm or the enhanced career prospects they have. This 
research suggests CEO compensation goes beyond the monetary items like salaries and 
stock options. 
When it comes to $1 CEO salaries, the research around this topic is more 
limited. Currently, there are two published accounting research articles centered around 
$1 CEOs. This research focuses on the situation that cause companies to move to $1 
salaries and the stock market returns caused by $1 salaries. Hamm, Jun and Wang 
(2015) sampled 93 CEOs from 1993 to 2011 looking at the determinants and outcomes 
of $1 CEO salaries. They concluded that this phenomenon occurs in two main 
situations. In the first situation, a firm needs to cut costs during a crisis, so the CEO 
sacrifices his or her salary. In the second scenario, the $1 salary is an indication of 
better future firm performance. The CEO is expressing faith in the progress of the 
company. The $1 salary is an attempt to align CEO and company interests.  
The second study by Loureiro (2014) looks at the motives and impact of $1 
salary on firm performance and CEO compensation. They conclude that $1 CEO firms 
have lower stock market returns after adoption of the $1 salary. This difference is 
heightened when firms have these salaries for overconfident CEOs and because of 
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things other than restructuring. Overall CEO compensation decreases usually for CEOs 
of restructuring firms. In firms that are not restructuring, $1 CEOs generally have 
higher bonuses and gains from stock holdings. Additionally, they examined the 
frequency of the $1 salary by state. California, Texas, and New York had the highest 
number of $1 CEOs. The most common industries for the $1 CEOs were prepackaged 
software and computer programming. This study is nearly five years old and several 
high-profile CEOs have joined the $1 salary trend since, bringing a renewed popularity 
to this form of compensation. Additionally, Loureiro’s research suggests that $1 salaries 
may not be viewed as a good sign by investors as the $1 salary firms experience lower 
stock market returns compared to similar firms. These two papers have conclusions that 
are contradictory, which suggests that research in this area of executive compensation is 
inconclusive, and there are remaining unanswered questions.  
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Research Question and Hypotheses 
This thesis aims to determine the nature of the relationship between $1 CEOs 
and long-term spending in the form of R&D and capital expenditures. The proposed 
hypothesis is that companies with $1 CEOs will have an increase in this type of 
spending. Additionally, there are two proposed reasons behind this hypothesized 
increase. The first potential reason is that CEOs with $1 salaries are signaling their 
belief in and care for the long-term value of the firm. As a result of this belief, they will 
invest in projects that will benefit the firm in the long term. The other proposed reason 
suggests that the $1 salary is a form of incentive compensation that then causes the 
CEOs to make spending decisions that will improve the value of the company long 
term.  
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Research Methods 
Data Collection 
To analyze the $1 salary trend, a dataset was compiled from several different 
existing databases. Financial data for the companies of interest came from the 
Compustat database. The Execucomp database was used to obtain information about 
CEO salaries and other characteristics of CEOs and executive compensation. This data 
was gathered from 1992 to 2018 and from 3,699 individual companies. This resulted in 
a dataset of 45,693 entries with 7,938 unique CEOs. 
 Several aspects of the dataset were reformatted to fit the research goals. For 
missing data items, zero was entered to complete the dataset. Additionally, there were 
many companies that had data missing for different years. In these cases, formulas were 
adjusted to compensate for these missing years. For example, several companies had 
single year entries with information for the year the CEO joined the company and their 
age, but this information was missing from the entries of following years with the same 
CEO. Several new columns were added to this dataset to expand the variables 
examined. Excel formulas were used to calculate the time that the CEO had been with 
the company and had been CEO. These variables, “time_in_co” and “time_as_ceo” are 
a calculation of the months that the CEO had been with the company and in their 
current position based on the fiscal year of the data entry. The other variable added was 
“$1 CEO?” This variable takes a value of zero or one depending on the CEO’s salary. If 
the CEO’s salary is equal to 0 or 0.001 (data in thousands) then the variable is given the 
value of one. If the salary is greater than 0.001, then it is given the value of zero. This 
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allowed the data to easily be filtered into $1 salary companies and non-$1 companies. 
From this dataset, there were 572 entries where “$1 CEO?” equaled one. Within these 
572 entries, there were 155 unique companies and 168 different CEOs.  
Univariate Testing 
Univariate testing was used to compare the $1 CEO companies to non-$1 CEO 
companies to see what variables change with different CEO compensation. These tests 
looked at individual variables and their relationship with the variable “$1 CEO?”  
A complete list of variables and their definitions can be found in the appendix. To test 
the relationship of these variables to $1 salaries, the data was divided into two groups, 
$1 CEO companies and non-$1 CEO companies. For each variable, the mean value was 
calculated for each group. These means were then compared in a t-test to determine if 
the variable of interest was statistically significant. The t-test was performed in Excel 
using the t-test: two sample assuming equal variances tool in the Excel data analysis 
toolkit. The test statistic was calculated from the two means and the standard deviation 
and then compared to the corresponding p-level to determine whether to accept or reject 
its statistical significance. The p-value used was 0.05. The hypotheses were: 
HO: μ$1 CEO = μnon-$1 CEO 
HA: μ$1 CEO ≠ μnon-$1 CEO 
Of the 21 variables tested, 14 resulted in p-values small enough to reject the null 
hypothesis. This means that the probability of the mean values of the variable of interest 
equaling each other is low enough to suggest that the means are statistically different. 
The variables that were statistically significant in relationship to the $1 salary were age, 
bonus, options awarded, salary, total compensation 2, CEO percentage ownership 
 
 
14 
 
including options, CEO percentage ownership excluding options, assets, research and 
development, capital expenditures, revenue, market value of equity, time in company 
(months), and time as CEO (months). These variables were then further examined in the  
next round of statistical testing.  
Table 1: Results of t-Tests with Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
This table represents the output of t-tests for each variable with two samples separated 
by $1 CEOs and non-$1 CEOs. Variable descriptions can be found in the appendix.  
Of interest to this research is the relationship between $1 CEOs and R&D 
spending. The t-test conducted on these two variables offered the following output.  
Variables Non $1 
CEOs 
Mean 
$1 CEOs 
Mean 
t Statistic P(T<=t) 
two-tail 
BONUS 462.656663 193.9467 4.31381871 0.00001607 
AGE 55.8153770 56.4884955 -2.1317245 0.03303483 
OPTION_AWARDS 1190.56177 2988.82216 -4.7245634 0.00000231 
OTHANN 27.1624550 21.83581 0.52047654 0.60273399 
OTHCOMP 246.294386 361.923 -1.9510163 0.05106120 
RSTKGRNT 228.604974 254.6351 -0.1849009 0.85330753 
SALARY 714.823871 0.000299 43.9278713 0 
TDC1 4984.27734 5573.725 -1.5578362 0.11927901 
TDC2 5567.32817 11637.98 -6.4081199 1.4876E-10 
SHROWN_TOT_PCT 1.17762237 4.453154 -17.475378 3.6799E-68 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCT 2.13165912 6.167558 -16.002552 1.7584E-57 
Assets 14988.9908 28541.5 -3.3572896 0.00078775 
RD 103.708035 376.4974 -10.824758 2.836E-27 
Capx 315.473189 567.5329 -4.7496121 2.0443E-06 
Revenue 5395.82663 8048.841 -3.6646665 0.00024794 
Income_bxi 338.816045 468.3137 -1.6254439 0.10407491 
Stockprice 62.5227824 45.31702 0.27206777 0.78557114 
Btm -200.801 0.017969 -0.10298 0.917977 
Mve 7455.75918 19305.49 -10.933736 8.6073E-28 
Time_in_co 164.176614 102.2727 7.00066108 2.5826E-12 
Time_as_ceo 87.7582057 76.32867 3.0841311 0.00204269 
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Table 2: Research and Development t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
This table represents the statistical output for a t-test with Research and Development 
spending as the variable. The dataset was divided into two samples by non-$1 CEO and 
$1 CEO. 
This t-test resulted in a p-value significantly smaller than the 0.05 p-value used to test 
for significance. Because of the small p-value, the null hypothesis that the mean R&D 
spending of the non-$1 CEOs and $1 CEOs groups are equal is rejected. Based off the 
mean values, it appears that companies have a higher average R&D spending when they 
have a $1 CEO compared to the larger dataset.  
Other variables that had especially low p-values were Bonus, Options Awarded, 
Salary, Total Compensation, CEO percentage ownership (including options), CEO 
percentage ownership (excluding options), Assets, Capital Expenditures, Revenue, 
Market Value of Equity, and Time in Company. All these variables had p-values less 
than 0.001. In previous research, the relationship between stock price and $1 CEOs has 
been studied. In the t-test for stock price, the test statistic was 0.272 which resulted in a 
p-value of 0.78. Because of the p-value was greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis was 
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not rejected, suggesting that there is not a statistically significant difference between the 
mean stock price of the $1 CEOs compared with non-$1 CEOs. On average, $1 CEOs 
work for companies that are larger, more profitable, and have higher R&D and capital 
expenditure spending compared to CEOs with more traditional salaries. Additionally, 
these $1 CEOs have spent less time working for the company but are slightly older than 
other CEOs. 
Introduction and Discontinuation of $1 Salary within Individual Companies 
To understand the trends surrounding the $1 salary on an individual company 
basis, analysis was conducted using a dataset of all the companies that at one point had 
a $1 CEO. This dataset had 2,253 individual entries with 572 of those being years 
where the company had a $1 CEO. Basic descriptive statistics such as mean, minimum, 
and maximum as well as histograms and linear graphs were used to understand the trend 
of the $1 salary over the past 25 years.  
Popularity and Trend of $1 CEOs since the 1990s 
The starting years for the $1 CEOs were organized into a frequency distribution 
chart to identify major trends. The most common five-year period for the $1 salary to 
start was between 2005 and 2009. The frequency distribution chart is shown below. 
Five-Year Period Number of new $1 CEOs 
1990-1994 7 
1995-1999 36 
2000-2004 33 
2005-2009 45 
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2010-2014 29 
2015-2019 15 
Table 3: Frequency Distribution of $1 Salary Starting Year 
This table shows the frequency distribution of the start of $1 salaries from 1990 to 2019 
over five-year periods.  
The popularity has decreased since its peak in 2007 when 14 CEOs took on a $1 salary. 
There were also a high number of new $1 CEOs in 2009 with 11 new members in the 
$1 salary club. Additionally, another peak period was 1999-2000 where there were 10 
and 11 CEOs who adopted a $1 salary, respectively.  
As far as the ending of these $1 salaries, 1999 and 2008 were the most popular 
years with 7 and 9 CEOs in these years respectively reverting to a larger salary. 
Three-Year Period Number of CEOs leaving $1 salary 
1993-1995 6 
1996-1998 9 
1999-2001 16 
2002-2004 14 
2005-2007 13 
2008-2010 17 
2011-2013 11 
2014-2016 9 
Table 4: Frequency Distribution of $1 Salary Ending Year 
This table shows the frequency distribution of the end of $1 salaries from 1993 to 2016 
over five-year periods. Companies who still had a $1 salary at the end of the available 
dataset were excluded from this table, as it is unknown if the CEO continued or will 
continue the $1 salary into future years.  
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The frequency distribution of the ending years shows that the ending years are 
somewhat evenly distributed across the data period. The highest number of CEOs 
leaving the $1 salary occurred in the twelve-year period from 1999 to 2010. Many 
companies still had the $1 salary in effect in the last year that data was reported. To 
compensate for this, CEOs were only considered to have left the $1 salary if in the 
following year the company reported a CEO salary above one dollar. 2017 was 
excluded from the ending year analysis because many companies did not have 2018 
data at the time of this study.  
 
Figure 1: Plot of End Year Date Frequencies 
This graph plots the number of CEOs who quit the $1 salary practice for each year from 
1993 to 2016. 
A graph of the ending year data shows a consistent number of CEOs leaving the $1 
salary per year with only a handful of outliers deviating significantly from the mean of 
3.9 companies per year.  
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Length of $1 Salaries 
Looking at how long individual companies kept a $1 salary structure shows a 
strong trend towards shorter $1 CEO time periods. There is a total of 165 observations 
of consecutive $1 salary periods in this dataset. Of these 165, 82.4% lasted 5 years or 
less with 36.97% being only a year or less. A histogram of this data shows the clear 
pattern of a significant decrease in the number of $1 CEOs as the length of time 
increases.  
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Length of $1 Salary 
This graph plots the length of consecutive $1 salary periods against the number of 
companies that had each of these different lengths from a year or less to twenty year-
long periods.  
The average number of years with a $1 salary is 3.69. There are a handful of outliers in 
the data with CEOs who have had a $1 salary for 10 to 20 years. Of the data on record 
for these $1 companies, 33.17% of the years have a $1 salary. As of 2017, 19.35% of 
the $1 companies have a $1 salary. This percentage is equal to 30 companies. 
 
 
20 
 
Some companies had nonconsecutive periods of a $1 salary which led to the 
sample size being larger than the 155 total companies that had or currently have a $1 
CEO. Within the $1 CEO company dataset, 10 companies had 2 nonconsecutive $1 
salary periods. The average time between these $1 salary periods was 4.1 years with the 
maximum time between being 8 years and the minimum 2 years.  
 
Multivariate Testing with R&D, CapEx, and $1 CEOs 
Multivariate testing was used to determine what factors can best predict $1 
CEOs as well as R&D and capital expenditure spending by using the variables 
determined to be statistically significant in univariate testing.  Using the same data as 
the univariate tests, this study relies on multiple regression analysis. This test controls 
for other factors to see how strong of a relationship the variables in question have with 
the $1 salary, with R&D spending, and with capital expenditures. The multivariate test 
looks at multiple variables at once to see how the strength of the relationship changes 
depending on the addition of other control variables. The regression analysis was 
performed in Excel using the regression tool in the Excel data analysis toolkit. This 
analysis generates an output that includes coefficient estimates, R squared, p-value, and 
standard error of the estimates. These statistics are used to determine how well the 
regression model fits the data. Three separate multivariate tests were conducted with $1 
salary, R&D spending, and capital expenditures each being individually examined as 
the dependent variable. 
When $1 CEO? was the y variable, the following variables were examined as 
potential independent variables: R&D, Options Awarded, Capital Expenditures, Time as 
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CEO, Percentage of Company Ownership including Options, Bonus, Time in Company, 
Total Compensation 2, Percentage of Company Ownership excluding Options, and 
Market Value of Equity. These variables were previously determined to be statistically 
significant in t-tests. Several multivariate tests were done using various combinations of 
these variables. The variables that had higher p-values were removed until the 
regression equation with the highest R-squared value remained. The R-squared value is 
the percentage of variation in $1 CEO? that is explained by the regression equation.  
Table 5: Multiple Regression Output for $1 CEO as Dependent Variable 
This table represents the multiple regression performed with the variable $1 CEO. 
Variable descriptions can be found in the appendix. 
The highest R-squared value resulting from the following independent variables: 
R&D, Capital Expenditures, Percentage of Company Ownership including Options, and 
Time in Company. Because the $1 CEO? variable takes a value of either zero or one, 
the coefficients in the regression equation describe how the probability of being a $1 
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CEO changes when the amount of the variables change. The intercept is the likelihood 
of being a $1 CEO without taking any other variables into consideration. In this dataset, 
the $1 CEO trend occurred about 1% of the time.  
The standard deviation of R&D spending is 599.685. Multiplying this amount 
by the R&D coefficient results in 0.0054. This means that the probability of having a $1 
CEO increases by 0.54% for every one standard deviation increase to R&D spending. 
The percentage of company ownership including options shows an even stronger 
increase to $1 CEO likelihood. It has a standard deviation of 4.47 which when 
multiplied by the coefficient 0.00214 results in 0.00957. Therefore, when company 
ownership is increased by one standard deviation, the likelihood of $1 CEO increases 
by almost one percent. The influence of capital expenditures is significantly weaker 
with a one standard deviation increase of 1,261.567 resulting in only a 0.088% increase 
in $1 CEO probability. Capital expenditures have a high p-value of 0.11 which suggests 
that this prediction of its influence on $1 CEO probability is not as strong as the other 
variables. Unlike the previous three variables, an increase to the time in company 
results in a decrease to the probability of $1 CEO. Increasing the time in company by 
the standard deviation of 210.3 months results in a 0.46% decrease to $1 CEO 
probability.  
When using R&D spending as the dependent variable, the resulting regression 
equations did a better job of explaining the variation in y with a higher R-squared value. 
The following variables were used in various combinations of regression models: $1 
CEO?, Capital Expenditures, Percentage of Company Ownership including Options, 
Revenue, Market Value of Equity, Assets, and Stock Price. With these variables, the 
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regression equation with the highest R-squared value was 0.357415. This means that the 
regression equation explained 35.7% of the variation in R&D spending. The Excel 
output of the regression is shown below. 
 
Table 6: Multiple Regression Output for R&D Spending as Dependent Variable 
This table represents the multiple regression performed with the variable R&D 
Spending. Variable descriptions can be found in the appendix. 
In this regression model, all the independent variables have p-values less than the 0.05 
mark for significance. The regression as a whole also has a high F value which results 
in a low p-value. This indicates that the equation describes a statistically significant 
relationship. The regression equation is as follows: 
R&D Spending = 4.9315 +111.3115 ($1 CEO?) + 0.0197 (Capital Expenditures) 
+ 0.0143 (Market Value of Equity) – 0.0009 (Assets) 
Because the $1 CEO variable had a p-value less than 0.05, it is statistically significant 
to the equation. This suggests that whether a company has a $1 CEO has an impact on 
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what its R&D spending will be. If a company has a $1 CEO, it will spend on average 
$111 million more on R&D than other companies.  
A regression analysis with capital expenditures as the dependent variable 
resulted in a higher R-squared value. The independent variables were $1 CEO?, R&D, 
Revenue, and Assets. With these variables, the regression equation had a R-squared 
value of 0.513. This means that the regression equation explained 51.3% of the 
variation in Capital Expenditure spending. The Excel output of the regression is shown 
below. 
 
Table 7: Multiple Regression Output for Capital Expenditures as Dependent Variable 
This table represents the multiple regression performed with the variable Capital 
Expenditures. Variable descriptions can be found in the appendix. 
All the independent variables have p-values less than or equal to the 0.05 mark for 
significance, and the regression has a high F value which results in a low p-value. Both 
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these things demonstrate that the relationship described by the regression equation is 
statistically significant. If a company has a $1 CEO, it will spend on average $72.67 
million more on capital expenditures than other companies. Both the univariate and 
multivariate tests support the idea that having a $1 CEO impacts other financial aspects 
of a company such as capital expenditure and R&D spending. Additionally, the 
existence of a statistically significant relationship between $1 CEOs and other executive 
related statistics such as percentage of company ownership and other forms of 
compensation suggests that a $1 CEO influences non-financial aspects of a company. 
This relationship also works the other way where because the company or CEO has 
certain characteristics, they then are more likely to have a $1 salary.  
Changes to Spending and Stock Price after $1 CEO Implementation 
Changes in R&D Spending Following $1 Salary 
To understand how the $1 salary impacts individual companies, the average 
R&D spending before and during the $1 CEO period was analyzed. I calculated the 
average R&D spending for each $1 company before the $1 salary using the year range 
of the $1 salary. This was then compared with the average R&D spending during the $1 
CEO period. The percentage change in R&D was found by dividing the average R&D 
before by the average R&D after and then subtracting 1. Of the 165 $1 salary periods, 
only 56 had percentage change in R&D that could be calculated. This was because 
some companies did not report R&D information or the average R&D before the 
institution of a $1 salary could not be calculated.  
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For the companies that could have R&D percentage change calculated, 34 
companies (60.7 percent) had an increase in R&D spending during the $1 salary 
compared with the years prior. The average increase to R&D spending was 104.5% but 
this mean is skewed because the minimum possible change to R&D spending is a 
hundred percent decrease. The largest increase was 2,120.9% which also skews the 
data. The median of 27.7% provides a more accurate picture of the increase to R&D 
spending that the companies experience after introducing a $1 salary. 
Changes in Capital Expenditure Spending Following $1 Salary 
The percentage change in capital expenditure spending was calculated in the 
identical manner as the R&D spending. However, more companies reported capital 
expenditure spending, so the sample size was larger. Of the $1 CEO companies 116 had 
capital expenditure spending information both before and during the $1 CEO salary 
period. These companies were more evenly split between exhibiting positive and 
negative changes to capital expenditures with 67 companies (53 percent) experiencing 
increases to spending. Once again, the average percentage change was skewed by the 
maximum possible decrease of 100%. Additionally, the largest increase was over 
1,000% increase. The median change to capital expenditures was a 14.4% increase 
which suggests that the $1 salary has a slight positive impact on this type of spending.  
Changes in Stock Price Following $1 Salary 
In a similar manner to R&D and capital expenditure spending, stock price was 
analyzed. The average stock price was calculated for the period before and during the 
$1 salary for each company. Stock price was one of the most reported variables and as a 
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result, the sample size was 130 companies with reporting data available. Of these 
companies, 74 or 56.9% had a decrease in stock price following the adoption of the $1 
salary. The average change was a 16.04% increase. However, this mean appears to be 
largely influenced by an outlier increase of 994%. The median is less influenced by this 
outlier and suggests that a decrease of 14.14% better represents the common trend in 
changes to stock price. These results are consistent with prior research that suggests the 
$1 salary generally results in lower stock returns.  
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Impact of Research Findings and Limitations 
Relationship to Capital Expenditures and R&D Spending 
In this research, long-term spending in the form of R&D and capital 
expenditures are used as proxies for management’s belief in future firm performance. 
R&D spending increases may signal that the firm is investing in more long-term 
spending due to a belief in its future prosperity. In the univariate testing, R&D spending 
had a statistically significant relationship with the $1 salary. This relationship suggested 
that having a $1 CEO increased the expected R&D spending. This positive relationship 
was further supported in the multivariate testing where R&D was a statistically 
significant variable in the regression equation predicting $1 CEOs and vice versa. In the 
regression equation for the dependent variable R&D spending, having a $1 CEO added 
an extra $111,311 to the prediction of R&D spending.  
As hypothesized, there is a positive relationship between these two variables 
suggesting that $1 CEOs result in more future-focused spending decisions. R&D 
spending is not guaranteed to result in profitability and often takes several months to 
several years to reap any benefits. When a company is facing financial hardship, or the 
CEO wants to cut costs to save money in the short-term, R&D spending may decrease. 
By investing more money into R&D, the CEO, who is ultimately responsible for all 
company decisions including budgetary manners, portrays an image of being invested in 
the company’s future. Because $1 CEOs generally invest more money into R&D, they 
may be more concerned with the firm’s long-term profitability. 
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Capital expenditure spending further supports this hypothesized long-term 
mindset of $1 CEOs. When looking at the univariate testing, capital expenditures had a 
similar relationship to $1 CEOs as R&D spending had. There was a statistically 
significant relationship between capital expenditures and $1 CEOs where $1 CEOs had 
higher mean capital expenditures than non-$1 CEOs. Capital expenditures involve 
investing money into long-term assets such as equipment, buildings, and other similar 
projects. These assets often require a large amount of money to be spent today for 
benefits that extend into the future. If a CEO is worried about cutting spending, they 
may be reluctant to spend thousands of dollars on a machine this year, even if that 
machine will be used well into the future. The positive relationship between capital 
expenditures and $1 CEOs and between $1 CEOs and R&D spending suggests that this 
form of compensation potentially encourages CEOs to be more long-term focused. 
These CEOs may make spending decisions that may not result in strong short-term 
benefits but will help the company long-term. 
When comparing R&D spending changes to that of capital expenditures, R&D 
spending increases more dramatically under a $1 CEO than it does for capital 
expenditures. The median change for R&D spending is over 13% higher than capital 
expenditures. This difference suggests that $1 CEOs tend to spend more money on 
riskier investments as R&D has a more unpredictable return than capital expenditures. 
From this research, it seems that CEOs with $1 salaries have strong beliefs in their firms 
as demonstrated by the $1 salary and increases to long-term spending. However, when 
looking at the change in stock price following the $1 salary, it appears that investors do 
not share this same belief in the firm.  
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Extreme Incentive Compensation 
By eliminating their reliance on a fixed salary, the $1 CEO is subjecting 
themselves to more incentive-based compensation. Their income is shifted to other 
sources such as bonuses, which were seen to have a positive statistically significant 
relationship with $1 salaries. The lack of a statistically significant difference in total 
compensation suggests that the $1 CEO has more pressure to meet incentives to 
maintain their level of compensation 
However, the length of $1 salaries provides support that the $1 salary may not 
be a true form of extreme incentive compensation. On average the $1 salary lasted less 
than four years with nearly 37% of the companies adopting this compensation form for 
only a year or less. One year may not be quite long enough to convince a CEO to make 
major changes to the company’s long-term strategy as the time between when their 
decisions significantly impact earnings or stock price may not be seen within just one 
year. The $1 salary may appear on the surface to be extreme incentive compensation as 
the CEOs compensation is more incentive-based than average. However, the CEO has 
considerable power over their compensation and would likely only allow that form of 
compensation if they believed the company would perform well enough in the future to 
meet performance targets. 
Investor Signaling 
Another possible motive behind the $1 salary is investor signaling. As discussed 
previously, the length of the $1 salary is relatively short, usually lasting for one to three 
years. The short length suggests that $1 CEOs are used to gain attention for the 
company. They may be a publicity action or an attempt to get investors to notice the 
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company. This theory is likely as CEOs have significant power over their compensation 
and would not be easily forced into an extreme incentive structure against their will. 
Because, as stated earlier, the CEO would most likely have an awareness of the nature 
and length of the $1 salary, this salary structure could be a deliberate act by the CEO to 
signal his or her faith in the company’s future.  
However, when looking at the stock price, if the $1 salary is for optics, it is not 
an effective tool for increasing investor perception of the company value. In the 
majority of cases, the $1 salary companies experienced a decrease in stock price. If the 
$1 salary is an attempt to signal to investors that the CEO strongly anticipates firm 
profitability and success, the market is not responding well to it.  
Limitations of Research 
There are several limitations of this research both in the data used and the scope 
covered that prevent further conclusions. Many companies within the dataset did not 
have reported information for many of the variables including R&D spending and 
capital expenditures. This made the analysis for these variables not as thorough and 
complete as it could have been. Additionally, there were missing years for some 
companies, and because the dataset started in the early 1990s, $1 CEO trends prior to 
this date were not analyzed. Another area that has room for more potential research is 
understanding the individual situations in which each $1 CEO arises.  
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Conclusion 
 
In recent years the $1 CEO salary has gained attention as more notable figures 
join its elite ranks. Many of these $1 CEOs portray it as an altruistic action to combat 
the growing greediness of executives. Some see this trend as a way to better align 
executive and company interests with the CEO’s income closely linked to company 
success via stocks and company ownership. This theory may view the $1 salary as a 
form of extreme incentive compensation designed to force CEOs to make decisions that 
fit the company’s best long-term interests. CEOs with $1 salaries do exhibit a more 
future-oriented mindset with higher R&D and capital expenditure spending. However, 
this thesis concluded that it is unlikely that true extreme incentive compensation is the 
structure behind this trend. Additionally, the $1 salary may be viewed as a form of 
investor signaling by expressing the CEO’s faith in the company and willingness to 
have their income completely dependent on firm performance in the stock market. This 
research suggests that while it is a possible motivation, the $1 salary does not result in 
higher investor valuation. As this trend continues to gain popularity, it will be important 
to understand its impact and the motivations behind it. While presented as a response to 
the growing wealth disparity and a solution to realign company and CEO interest, the 
lack of a significant change in total compensation and short-lived nature of most $1 
salaries suggest that this trend may more likely be an ineffective attempt at signaling.  
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Appendix 
 
Variable Variable Definition 
AGE Age of CEO 
BONUS Bonus awarded to CEO 
OPTION_AWARDS_RPT_VALUE Options awarded to CEO 
OTHANN  
OTHCOMP Other compensation 
RSTKGRNT Restricted stock grants 
SALARY Salary 
TDC1 Total compensation 1 
TDC2 Total compensation 2 
SHROWN_TOT_PCT CEO percentage ownership 
(including options) 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCT CEO percentage ownership 
(excluding options) 
Assets Assets 
Rd Research and development 
Capx Capital expenditures 
Revenue Revenue 
Income_bxi Income before 
extraordinary items 
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Stockprice Stock price 
Btm Book-to-market 
Mve Market value of equity 
Time_in_co Time in company (months) 
Time_as_ceo Time as CEO (months) 
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